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Demythelogizing Personal Loyalty to Superiors
Overview
This paper is constructed in the Cartesian tradition of skepticism and complemented by a 
Humeanian strand of “New Scenes of Thought” (Lavine, 1984, P.153, P.148). Its subject matter 
is both critical and stubborn—a possible reason, perhaps, why relatively fewer writers addressed 
it. Those who did include Drucker, 1974; Ewin, 1993; Fletcher, 1993; Kleinig, 1994; and 
Souryal 1999. This author hopes the criminological community will consider a logical debate 
over the controversial, yet unexamined role of personal loyalty in public and private 
organizations. The paper’s logic, provocative as it may be, is also designed to expose the truth of 
such an ancient legacy that still clings to medieval learning and church teachings. Like theology, 
leadership, and romance, the subject of personal loyalty in superiors is hard to define and harder 
still to disavow lest one be accused of administrative blasphemy. As evidence of its 
controversiality, consider in ancient Christian history when both Peter and Judas betrayed The 
Christ for different loyalties, (i.e., the former to save his life and the latter to enrich his life by 
serving his handlers)—all while other disciples accepted death for not recanting their loyalty to 
The Christ. It might be also significantly interesting to note that the United States’ Founding 
Fathers never mentioned the word loyalty in the Constitution nor in any laws they promulgated 
when it indeed would have been highly relevant.
This article is by no means designed as a wrecking ball to the ideal of loyalty to God, 
country, family, spouse, friends, even superiors—if both parties maintained a mature 
relationship. In the bureaucratic tradition, superiors and subordinates are technically subject to 
the same set of rules and regulations, disciplinary actions, and the obligation to act in good faith. 
Under these conditions, superiors and subordinates—regardless of position, rank, or status— 
need only to perform their duties according to work standards, and no amount of personal loyalty 
to superiors should make them more or less loyal.
Leading this deterministic view is Peter Drucker, (1974) the prophet of management, who 
wrote: “employment is a specific contract calling for specific performance, and for nothing 
else...any attempt of any employer to go beyond this is usurpation. It is immoral as well as 
illegal intrusion of privacy...an employee owes no loyalty, he owes no love, he owes no 
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attitude—he owes performance and nothing else." Other organizational theorists were less 
absolutist than Drucker. For instance, Denhardt (1987) equated loyalty in public organizations 
with images of death and slavery, and Ewin (1993) proposed it be outright ignored. Based on 
Drucker’s absolutist position (and the others mentioned above), it might be safe to hypothesize 
that public agencies, in general, and criminal justice agencies, in particular, which allow, 
tolerate, or encourage personal loyalty to superiors are either managerially misinformed (e.g. 
ignorant of the principles of merit, fairness, responsibility and accountability), or they are 
disingenuous because, despite their prior knowledge, they continue to consider personal loyalty 
to themselves more important than to fair management, merit considerations, and the 
subordinate’s right to legitimately pursue excellence. At this junction, it might be also safe to 
characterize the unrecognized variable of personal loyalty to superiors, especially if prevalent, as 
a cancer that mutates in the “flesh and bones” of agencies causing them to eventually succumb to 
ineffectualness, lethargy, and corruption.
The main purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to raise awareness to the potential dangers of 
personal loyalty to superiors (rather than to the organization itself, the profession, the Supreme 
Court rulings, and, of course, the Constitution); (2) to liberate the subordinates from the 
proverbial subservience to superiors; and (3) to unleash the subordinates’ capacity to investigate 
and reason in a manner that follows a harmonious order of legal, logical, and ethical principles. 
The situation, of course, can be terribly awkward if the superiors themselves enticed, solicited, or 
demanded such loyalty (which not infrequently occurs), leading the organization to lose 
dimension of what makes its legitimate.
In the final analysis, the central question in this article is to determine whether personal 
loyalty to superiors has a place in criminal justice bureaucracies, and if so, to whom, to what, and 
at what price?
Three preliminary Assumptions
The reader should first be apprised of three logical observations associated with the 
principle of loyalty and loyalties in public organizations. First, the original condition (Hume’s 
expression) of loyalty has little to do with objectivity and more to do with ingrained prejudice. 
Historically, it thrived when individuals and groups supported a tribal chief, an orator cleric, or a 
sacrosanct tradition without fully understanding the reasons and consequences of such a belief. 
That is probably one reason, Islamic terrorists are among the hardest to change and the most 
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resistant to accepting modernity and democracy. Second, while the readers might rightfully 
assume that the practice of personal loyalty to superiors is a standard behavior common to all 
bureaucracies (e.g., hospitals, universities, prisons, or even religious institutions), one should be 
cautioned that—even if it is true—such a practice in the field of criminal justice, especially under 
unsavory superiors, can cause horrendous harm to individuals, groups, and even nations. 
Criminal justice subordinates might—under the influence of personal loyalty to superiors— 
violate people’s constitutional rights, cover up corruption, ostracize minority groups, perjure 
themselves in court, or torture inmates in prison on a scale not possible in non-criminal justice 
agencies. Third, any type of loyalty is ostensibly a “double power game’’ (Morris, 1997, p 33). 
Morris’s term can be simply translated as “to the extent something has power for good, it has 
corresponding power for ill.” As evidence of that, loyalty was equally capable of bringing about 
perpetual happiness (e.g., loyalty to liberty and justice) and of inflicting disastrous pogroms (e.g., 
loyalty to the Nazi or Fascist parties). This factor alone might underscore the urgent need to 
debate the subject of personal loyalty to superiors especially in light of Manning’s (2007: 6) 
stern caution that personal loyalty to superiors (as demonstrated during the Nuremberg trials) 
was a main cause for the rise of the Nazi policing system in Germany
The Ambivalent Nature of Loyalty
Loyalty is a mercurial and ambiguous sentiment. Konvitz (1973,108) defined it as "a 
virtue, a state, or a quality of being faithful to one's commitments, duties, relations, associations, 
or values. He added that at the core of the virtue of loyalty is fidelity—is keeping one’s promise 
and never unjustifiably violating agency rules. Fletcher (1993, p, 171) defined loyalty as "a life 
in which interaction with others becomes the primary means for solving problems." Ewin (1993, 
36) referred to it as "an emotional tie that can lead people to be unreasonable and to overlook or 
override proper claims on them." Yet Fletcher also exposed loyalty's fundamental bias by 
pointing out that "by definition, [loyalty] generates interest, partiality, an identification with the 
object of one's loyalty rather than with the cause it serves" (p. 57). Then there were Hume (the 
paramount skeptic) and Blamires (the perpetual pessimist). The former defined loyalty as “a 
virtue that holds less of reason than of bigotry and superstition" (as cited in Kleinig, 1996,70) 
and the latter likened loyalty to an intoxicant: "we breathe the word loyalty and immediately a 
sentimental warmth floods our minds" (as cited in Souryal, 1999, 46). He further added (p. 47) 
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that loyalty, in and by itself, “represses individuality, encourages isolationism, and prohibits the 
circulation of fresh and useful ideas...it parcels out the soul of workers by subverting their 
professional responsibility.” In criminal justice agencies, Souryal (1999, 57) defined personal 
loyalty to superiors as “the workers' obligation to submit to superiors, do what it takes to protect 
their interests without exposing themselves to significant danger."
In light of these contradictory characterizations, it is not surprising that many 
unenlightened criminal justice superiors attempt to cultivate (rather recruit) personal loyalty 
from subordinates as a matter of self-protection should they (the superiors) be accused of abusing 
authority, mishandling funds, or engaging in power struggles with rivals at the workplace. By 
contrast, it is also not surprising that many criminal justice subordinates are baffled: they recall 
their academy instructors never discussing the subject of loyalty save in the context of one 
another. Yet early on the job, they realize that that was not the case and that personal loyalty to 
superiors is what matters, the main key to success (Kleinig, 1996). This state of affairs makes it 
safe to suggest that the footprints of personal loyalty to superiors are initially formed by the 
agency’s organizational culture (Braswell, 2005, 89), Kleinig 1995, 1996; Souryal, 1999). As 
cases in point, one must reflect on the ongoing investigations into the alleged torture at the Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq, the circumstances leading to the investigation of Valerie Plame Wilson 
who worked for the CIA, and the recent firing of eight Federal Prosecutors by Attorney General 
Gonzales (New York Times May 25, 2004, and July 14, 2003, respectively).
Torn between this dysfunctional environment and the subordinates’ mental dissonance, one 
can understand the reasons for resentment that professional subordinates feel in some criminal 
justice agencies. They suffer silently for fear of being accused of disloyalty, labeled as trouble 
makers, or worse: whistle blowers. Fletcher (1993, 155), the inquisitor of loyalty, describes this 
condition in two separate references: “we typically find ourselves in a set of intersecting circles 
of loyalty and commitment,” and, “such conditions typically mark a tyrannical state” (p.59). The 
first reference is rather restricting and the latter is dismally threatening.
The Machination of Personal Loyalty
Lest the point is lost, personal loyalty to superiors can be defined as the unspoken practice by 
subordinates to submit to the person of superiors, rather than to their organizational positions, with the 
intention of gaining more workplace privileges rather than earning such privileges by faithfully 
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contributing to the mission of the organization. In vernacular terms, such subordinates are generically 
known as “good ole boys” or “good ole girls,” and their behavior is normally disparaged in more sordid 
terms by professional subordinates who despise such a practice.
This definition requires five agency organisms: (1) a superior with effective authority to 
control the behavior and the future interests of others under his/her command; (2) a subordinate 
who is required to obey orders received from higher sources; (3) a “special” relationship of 
social, intellectual, financial, religious, or sexual affinity which, unless professionally 
suppressed, can enhance the interests of both the superior and the subordinate; (4) an audience 
(usually of subordinates) who are perceptive, envious, skeptical, hostile, or merely lazy and 
gossipy, and (5) an organizational culture which chronicles significant experiences (both good 
and bad) internalized in the memory of all concerned as belief systems and used as managerial 
footprints for the future. The amalgamation of these five organisms defines the unique condition 
of the agency and its propensity to succumb to the cancer of personal loyalty to superiors 
growing in its belly.
On the other hand, when the agency’s organizational culture is skewed, its managerial 
pattern becomes dysfunctional. More seriously, it can cause mental dissonance to develop among 
subordinates who may feel they are treated unfairly, receive little or no pay raises, accused of 
disloyalty, concerned for their careers, or are simply ignored. Such a dysfunctional environment 
undermines agency productivity at two levels: First, by emboldening the “good ole boys” to 
bully the professional workers who take their job seriously and act responsibly while they have a 
better opportunity to commit worse corrupt acts with more impunity. Second, the practice of 
personal loyalty to superiors will presumptively spread through the agency encouraging 
disregard for rules and regulations, maintaining haughty relations between colleagues, and 
escalating the chances for more scandals to erupt threatening the agency’s chances to survive.
Proponents of personal loyalty to superiors justify—even defend—such a practice by 
invoking clever arguments that will be presented in the paper. Consider, for instance, the 
disappointment of criminal justice subordinates (e.g., police officers, jailers, correctional 
officers, as well as probation and parole officers). While in pre-service training they are taught to 
be loyal to the United States Constitution, state laws, departmental rules and regulations and 
professional values. Then they are systematically indoctrinated to reserve their first and foremost 
loyalty to their superiors, especially those who were responsible for hiring them in the first place.
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The case of thousands of small sheriff3 departments (especially those which are not covered by 
civil service rules) is a case in point. Given their moderate level of training and their rather huge 
obligation to take on risky cases, deputy sheriffs seek protection by offering their personal 
loyalty to their chief deputies and sheriffs (Hill, 2007,185). By so doing, they become almost 
totally dependent on these superiors. In this context, they tend to always support their superiors’ 
desires, advocate their views, and acquiesce with their decisions, even if such decisions were 
clearly inconsistent with state or agency rules and regulations.
Loyalty is not a constant subject, otherwise it would be mere sympathy. For instance, we 
may sympathize with the people of Darfur but that does not mean that we are loyal to them. If 
there is any loyalty involved in such a case, it is indirectly through the overarching principle of 
humanity, the obligation to assist "our kind" by aiding those among us who are in a crisis. The 
core sentiment underlying this obligation is the recognition that humankind is our kind, and that 
the demise of any person diminishes us all.
Personal loyalty to superiors is a different species because its original condition is 
intrinsically different: (1) While the vast majority of public service subordinates consider 
themselves colleagues, in the competitive, stressful, and, at times unsavory workplace 
environments they may act like strangers to each other, if not outright enemies. (2) Subordinates 
as individuals do not necessarily share the same affiliations (e.g., race, ethnicity, class, or 
educational background). (3) Subordinates do not choose whom they work for or for how long. 
(4) The ideal of public service does not necessarily lend itself to the exercise of collegiality. 
Subordinates are required to “faithfully execute all laws” even at the cost of betraying one’s 
loyalty to another. Indeed the role of Internal Affairs in criminal justice agencies is not to 
preserve loyalties, but to expose them when they act against the stated mission of agencies. and, 
(5) Consistent with Kant’s rule of universalization, if the subordinates were to spend all their 
working time appeasing their superiors, there wouldn’t be enough time to serve the agency’s 
mission and those who need their full attention. Ironically, but rather understandably, Drucker’s 
severe dictum against any personal loyalty to superiors might have been the underlying reason 
why both subordinates and superiors felt in need for protection by means of forming personal 
loyalty pacts, in the first place.
Consider, for instance, the troubling statements by two high-ranking criminal justice 
officials cited by Kleinig (1994) during a meeting. The first person stated that "when an 
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organization wants you to do right, it asks for your integrity; when it wants you to do wrong, it 
demands your loyalty." The second person stated, "when I make an appointment, I look for two 
things; loyalty and competence, in this order" (Kliening,1994, pp. 10-11). Unless one is a 
neophyte, the former statement is ethically bankrupt, and unless one is a cynic, the latter 
statement is a naturalistic fallacy. If these statements are accurate, then one might ask: if the 
value of competence is lower than the value of personal loyalty, how then can society be assured 
that its workers are competent enough to make intelligent decisions for the good of all 
concerned? Kleinig concluded on a more disturbing note: "the more ethically troubling 
implication of this citation was not what the official stated, but the fact that it was not too 
troubling to those who were present" (Kleinig, 1994, pp. 10- 11). This stance can be explained in 
terms of while Drucker’s dictum may be too Weberian to criminal justice agencies, by virtue of 
their constant association with criminals, and having been accustomed to the practice of personal 
loyalty over the years, they have no real aversion to it.
The Grammar of Workplace Loyalties
For these reasons, it might be necessary to first acquaint public officials (especially 
criminal justice superiors and subordinates) with three types of workplace loyalties. These will 
be ranked here on a scale of their appropriateness; the first type will be the lowest and the last the 
highest.
Personal loyalty to superiors is the lowest rung on the ladder of workplace loyalties. It is 
tribal in nature and constitutes the subordinates' unexamined obligation to accept, comply with, 
and support the superiors' needs and wishes, even when such needs and wishes are inappropriate. 
Examples include the obligation of police officers and correctional officers to be subservient to 
their sergeants, lieutenants, and chiefs. In return, there is usually the unspoken assumption that if 
these officers were ever in trouble (e.g., accused of making illegal arrests or roughing up an 
inmate), they should expect more lenient treatment (from their superiors), if any at all. The 
guiding statement at this level is: for each subordinate according to his or her personal loyalty to 
superiors.
Institutional loyalty is the next rung up the ladder of workplace loyalties. It is 
organizational in nature and constitutes the subordinates' obligation to accept, comply with, and 
support the agency's mission and to honor its ends-means strategy. Examples include the 
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obligation of probation officers not to revoke a person's probation except when based on agency 
rules and regulations, professional standards, and ethically accepted practices. The officers 
involved are expected to objectively examine the circumstances of each case, solicit legal advice, 
and use justifiable judgment. The guiding statement at this level is: for each subordinate 
according to his or her devotion to the agency's mission.
Integrated loyalty is the highest and most ethical level of workplace loyalties. It is idealistic 
in nature and constitutes the subordinates' obligation to abide, above all else, with the 
constitutional principles, the ideals of public service, and the principles of ethical management. 
Examples include the subordinates' obligation to honor the sanctity of life, the people’s human 
rights to freedom and dignity, to apply justice by first securing a bona fide probable cause, and to 
act with enlightenment, compassion, and goodwill. It represents the unadulterated commitment 
to the doctrines of equality, impartiality, decency, and service—indeed to the basic ingredients of 
human civility. The guiding statement at this level is: for each subordinate according to his or 
her commitment to constitutional, legal, and moral ideals.
Honoring this grammar of loyalties can be also identified by its durability. Personal loyalty 
to superiors is rather superficial, short lived, and seldom outlives the subordinate-superior 
immediate relationship. Institutional loyalty is genuine, rational, long-lived, and lasts as long as 
the subordinate and the superior maintain such a relationship. Integrated loyalty is philosophical, 
enlightened, and transcendent. It continues throughout the subordinates’ life regardless of which 
agencies they may later serve. More importantly, compliance with this grammar of workplace 
loyalties cannot be treated casually or chosen at will. It requires a more profound knowledge of 
social sciences, a tenacious concern to serve the public interest especially at a hardship, and an 
unwavering commitment to promote a civil community.
To institutionalize this typology, it is suggested that this grammar of workplace loyalties 
follow this order: (1) Personal loyalty to superiors, being the most harmful, temporary and 
volatile, should be discouraged to minimize unfairness, professional jealousy, clannishness, 
favoritism, bickering, and spreading rumors at the workplace. Herzberg (1976, 63) described 
such behaviors as hygiene factors because they can make the agency managerially sick and its 
workers paranoid. (2) Institutional loyalty, being benign, durable, and mission-based should be 
the main staple of everyday loyalty. It should be encouraged and under no circumstances 
replaced by personal loyalty. (3) \Integrated loyalty, representing the highest level of enlightened 
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loyalty, should be the cornerstone of all professional and constitutional loyalties and the summum 
bonum of all workplace loyalties. It should be always admired, highly appreciated, and treated as 
acts of administrative supererogation. In this sense, Royce may have been prophetic when he 
referred to integrated loyalty as loyalty to loyalty (Royce, 1908).
Six Questions to Ponder
To articulate the extent of the organizational damage that could be caused by personal 
loyalty to superiors, both subordinates and superiors should rationally ponder the following six 
questions:
First, despite the cultural prevalence of personal loyalty to superiors in public agencies, 
there is no evidence that this practice enhances agencies’ productivity. Indeed it might more 
likely diminish it (Schulman, 2007, 14-20). This observation may also compel one to ask: "if 
personal loyalty to superiors is such a great idea, why are agency rules and regulations so 
reticent about it?" By the same token, if personal loyalty to superiors is a matter of choice, why 
then are those who offer it so handsomely rewarded while those who don’t are not only deprived 
of the same but not infrequently shunned?
Second, the practice of personal loyalty to superiors ignores the fact that some superiors are 
not worthy of loyalty. This can be shown by the fairly large number of supervisors and 
administrators who are fired or disciplined every year at all levels of government. And, if that is 
the case, wouldn’t be contradictory to expect criminal justice subordinates to be loyal to 
unworthy superiors, and hypocritical if they were to be compelled to do so?
Third, the fact that a large number of superiors treat personal loyalty as a one-way-street 
relationship (i.e., they need not return the loyalty) destroys the core of loyalty as a noble 
sentiment based on trust, fidelity, and reciprocity. And, since trust, fidelity, and reciprocity, in a 
free society, cannot be forced upon the subordinates, wouldn’t that destroy the value of all other 
loyalties rendering them empty claims or propaganda techniques? And wouldn’t that—in and by 
itself—further demoralize the subordinates?
Fourth, superiors are routinely transferred to other positions. They also resign, retire, or 
die. In any such, case, subordinates would be at a loss as to how they should behave when the 
new superiors arrive. As a logical proposition, loyalty cannot be automatically transferred nor are 
new superiors entitled to automatic loyalty. Hill (2003, 258) points out that loyalty must be 
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allowed to evolve freely “as a seed grows into a tree.” Therefore, would it not be utterly foolish 
if subordinates were able to turn off their personal loyalty to an outgoing superior, and rather 
comical if—as if by a flicking of a light switch—turn on loyalty to the new incomer?
Fifth, the excuse that personal loyalty to superiors is a benign knee-jerk reaction, one that is 
akin to saluting commanders on military bases, is misleading. While saluting military 
commanders is required by military rules, personal loyalty to superiors is not. Furthermore, 
while no harm to third parties occurs when military commanders are saluted, serious harm can 
occur to third parties if criminal justice subordinates were to thoughtlessly comply with a 
superior's foolish desire. Moreover, if personal loyalty to superiors were truly intended as a 
reflex action (an assumption which the author rejects), wouldn’t that render the entire principle 
of loyalty pointless?
Sixth, the more public agencies are subjected to external pressure (e.g., a state audit, a 
criminal investigation, a charge of misappropriation of funds), the more their leaders would 
demand personal loyalty from their subordinates. By contrast, no loyalty demands are normally 
made when the agency is functionally stable. Wouldn’t that lead the subordinates to be 
suspicious of the true intentions of their superiors? Furthermore, wouldn’t it make the 
subordinates suspect that they are a commodity being exploited when a catastrophe is about to 
occur? As a daunting illustration, consider the story of Governor Earl Long of Louisiana who, 
upon hearing he had just lost a favorite legislative bill by a single vote, and who, upon 
identifying the responsible legislator who did not vote for the bill, accused him of disloyalty. 
According to the story, the legislator apologetically responded "but Governor, I have always 
been with you when you are right." At that moment, the governor rudely interrupted: "you stupid 
man, I don’t need you when I am right!" (Brookhiser, 2008, p. 217). Even if this story is 
fictitious (although it is well documented), it can more graphically demonstrate how 
disingenuous the practice of personal loyalty to superiors can be .
Based on the previous discussions, it should be safe to suggest that if criminal justice 
agencies are based on the principles of justice, honor, honesty, and duty, then the practice of 
personal loyalty to superiors demonstrates incoherence. This can be explained by the primary­
secondary obligation paradigm. By virtue of their professional obligation, the subordinates' 
primary loyalty is to ensure that all laws are being faithfully executed and to serve the public 
fairly and equitably. If this is the case, then all other loyalties should be considered secondary.
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Furthermore, if criminal justice subordinates were expected (or, worse still, required) to consider 
personal loyalty to superiors as their primary obligation, that would be undoubtedly 
questionable. The subordinates would be irrational if they acted on the basis of ignorance, and 
disingenuous if they acted on the basis of prior knowledge. In either case, the agency's integrity 
will be impugned, and the community will suffer.
The Defining Line
Before presenting the arguments for and against personal loyalty to superiors, three 
self-evident concepts should be addressed since they are essential to understanding the analytical 
construct of personal loyalty to superiors in the organizational setting.
Contractible and Non-contractible Obligations
The practice of personal loyalty to superiors should not be confused with the institutional 
need for control, discipline, or even with the strictest type of rules and regulations. These are, by 
definition, contractible obligations. They are embedded in the organizational structure of the 
agency, publicized in advance, and enforced through official rules and regulations. As such, they 
are primary relationships that are good in themselves. They are essential if the agency’s structure 
is to be preserved and its stated goals are to be met. Personal loyalty to superiors, on the other 
hand, is a non-contractible obligation—one that is arguably contrived by the superiors to 
augment their own power. The reason behind this assertion may be the fact that for agencies to 
survive, they must comply with agency rules and regulations, yet when superiors and 
subordinates enter into personal loyalty pacts, they, by silent implication, agree to bend the rules 
and regulations, that errors would be covered up, support would always be offered, and minor 
misbehaviors would be quietly forgiven. The difference between these two scenarios— 
contractible and non-contractible obligations—is similar to requiring school children to study 
hard to pass the exams and to bring the teacher an apple to be treated favorably by the teacher. 
Using the same analogy, it would be rather naive to believe that when police or correctional 
officers put their lives in danger, they would be doing that for personal loyalty to their superiors. 
It would be much more plausible to believe that when they do so, they are motivated by a 
professional sense of devotion that calls upon their inner strength to overcome "impossible" 
odds.
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The Primacy of Justice in the Equation of Criminal Justice
Unlike medicine, trade, or diplomatic service, criminal justice is not just another field of 
public service; it is critical to maintaining justice, adjudicating suspects, and maintaining social 
control—activities that are fundamental to the presence of a civil society. To be legitimately 
able to achieve that, criminal justice subordinates should always uphold the ideals of freedom, 
equal protection, and due process—basic values that are inextricably associated with the primacy 
of justice. Accordingly, no work value should be considered any higher than the principle of 
justice, including, of course, personal loyalty to superiors. Furthermore, if criminal justice 
subordinates were to be persuaded (or worse compelled) to massage the truth or to bend the rules 
to “keep the bosses happy,” the entire field of criminal justice would be endangered and the 
summum bonum of the doctrines of criminal justice compromised.
The Imperative of Preserving Democracy
In a free society, any governmental branch that condones unrestricted submission to an 
individual or a minority of individuals, whether they are governors, mayors, or chief 
administrators, undermines society's democratic values. While totalitarian and fascist 
governments are extreme cases, the principle is, nevertheless, the same. Consider, for example, 
the public embarrassment the United States government underwent because of the Abu Ghraib 
and Guantanamo scandals, the embarrassment of the Los Angeles police department because of 
the Rodney King case, and the embarrassment of the New York City police department because 
of the Louima Abner case. In each of these cases, it seems safe to assume that democracy would 
have been far better served had the subordinates been far more loyal to the constitutional 
obligations enshrined in the Bill of Rights than to the dictates or desires of their superiors.
Arguments In Favor of Personal Loyalty to Superiors
Proponents of personal loyalty to superiors argue that this practice is essential for three 
reasons: (1) it inhibits organizational disloyalty; (2) it bolsters the agency’s chain of command; 
(3) it enhances institutional responsibility; and (4) it motivates the subordinates to foster 
supererogation. Each of these arguments will be discussed in the following section.
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Personal Loyalty to Superiors Inhibits Organizational Disloyalty
This view assumes that if subordinates owed no personal loyalty to their superiors, they 
would owe no loyalty to the organization. This logic is inaccurate for three reasons: First, the 
superiors are only tools for achieving organizational ends. The end, in this case, is the 
department itself. Therefore, withholding personal loyalty from the former is not denying 
loyalty to the latter. Second, the sentiments of loyalty and disloyalty are not mutually exclusive 
since the opposite of loyalty is not disloyalty, but the absence of loyalty, and the opposite of 
disloyalty is not loyalty, but the absence of disloyalty. Consequently, the absence of personal 
loyalty cannot constitute evidence of disloyalty (which is basically professional betrayal). For 
instance, one can have personal loyalty to a political party without wanting the opposing party to 
perish. By the same token, along the continuum of loyalty-disloyalty, there is a middle mass of 
subordinates who are better known as a-loyals. These subordinates are fairly independent, strong, 
and devoted to carrying out their official duties to the best of their abilities without having to 
entangle themselves in any political squabbles including loyalty pacts. In a meta-ethical sense, a- 
loyal criminal justice subordinates may be even more loyal to the organization itself because they 
endorse institutional or integrated loyalties. Third, the claim that personal loyalty to superiors 
can inhibit organizational disloyalty does not explain the ever-increasing "whistle blowing" 
phenomenon whereas a-loyal workers publicly denounce personal loyalties in favor of what they 
consider loyalty to the organization or the community they serve. As a case in point, Frederic 
Whitehurst, an FBI forensic scientist, in 1995, blew the whistle to call attention to the problems 
in the FBI crime lab. When he was accused of disloyalty, he defended himself by invoking his 
loyalty to higher loyalties—ones he accused his superiors of ignoring. Whitehurst's act of 
a-loyalty indeed ended up as an act of supererogation, and the FBI crime lab underwent 
monumental reforms.
Personal Loyalty to Superiors Bolsters the Agency’s Chain of Command
This view suggests that building a chain of personal loyalty to superiors can strengthen 
the agency’s chain of command. While this argument sounds plausible, it is flawed for two 
reasons. First, it is self-evident that a chain of command does not necessarily coincide with a 
chain of loyalty—command is a body of rules, but loyalty is a body of sentiments. A soldier 
may legitimately preserve the chain of command out of organizational discipline without 
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necessarily being personally loyal to the unit’s commanders. The case of Benedict Arnold may 
be the most infamous example. While he was always faithful to George Washington’s chain of 
command, when the opportunity availed itself to defect he totally discarded his personal loyalty 
to his beloved army’s chief commander. By the same token, during the Vietnam War, many 
dissatisfied soldiers—while maintaining their chain of command—held little personal loyalty to 
their commanding officers. Many such commanders were intentionally killed by their own 
subordinates who felt these commanders failed to reciprocate their loyalty.
Even if a tight chain of command was possible, loyalty chains invariably break when power 
arrangements change from within or without, when supervisors are hired laterally, or when 
professional jealousy and personal conflicts permeate the ranks. For example, when a 
correctional lieutenant is promoted to the rank of assistant warden, creating a situation whereas 
her former captain now serves under her command, the existing chain of personal loyalty must 
change. Second, even if a perfect chain of loyalty existed, the agency's integrity would be only 
as strong as the integrity of its weakest link. To make the point clearer, if the chain of command 
argument is perfect, then technically no acts of disloyalty could ever be committed by any 
middle manager, deputy director, or assistant bureau head. Yet, such acts routinely occur without 
any noticeable loss of agency efficiency. The case of chief deputies who run for office against 
their own sheriffs is a poignant case in point.
Personal Loyalty to Superiors Fosters Supererogation
According to this view, personal loyalty obligates workers to perform supererogatively— 
above and beyond the call of duty. The idea of supererogation lies in Christian theology, 
particularly the story of the Good Samaritan who paid the innkeeper "over and above for taking 
care of the robbed and wounded man" (Heyd, 1982, p. 18). Typically, supererogatory acts are 
seen as "saintly and heroic, those in which people make sacrifices to achieve a morally good 
end" (Heyd, 1982, p. 118). However, with the exception of police and correctional officer, 
perhaps, most supererogatory deeds in criminal justice are relatively minor acts, such as staying 
after hours to finish paperwork or perform extra tasks that are not specified in the work contract 
(Souryal, 1999).
Although supererogation is an admirable virtue, there is no evidence that supports the view 
that supererogatory acts by criminal justice subordinates are essentially due to personal loyalty 
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to superiors. It is implausible to suggest, for instance, that when correctional officers risk facing 
armed rioting inmates they would be doing so because of their personal loyalty to any specific 
supervisor. It would be much more logical to argue that they do that only out of reverence to 
duty.
One should also realize that not all supererogatory acts are considered worthy acts. Some 
may be arbitrary or even foolhardy. Consider, for example, the famous last stand of General 
Custer. Was his decision to fight until death an act of supererogation, or was it a strategically 
misguided decision? Was it more consistent with proper military rules or just a product of his 
personal egoism? And, finally, was it even worth doing? In light of these questions, one might 
legitimately conclude that supererogatory acts in criminal justice may have nothing to do with 
personal loyalty to superiors and everything to do with one’s commitment to act or not to act.
Arguments Against Personal Loyalty to Superiors
Since no empirical research exists concerning this specific topic (personal loyalty to 
superiors), to examine the truth of the matter, only logical and historical methods will be used. 
From a logical perspective, it seems fair to conclude that when personal loyalty to superiors 
eclipses the subordinates’ obligation of institutional loyalty (e.g., professionalism, fairness, 
duty), the agency loses its legal equilibrium, and when it eclipses the subordinates’ obligation of 
integrated loyalty (e.g., reason, justice, honesty, civility), it loses its moral equilibrium. In either 
case, agencies may act irresponsibly, creating as many illegal or immoral behaviors as they can 
create appropriate and professional ones. Evidence of this can be easily seen in the seeming 
inability of many criminal justice agencies to prevent the abuse of force, violations of the 
Constitution, involvement in drug distribution, and committing acts of racism, cronyism, and 
abuse of power. (Ewin, 1993, 36). And if that is an accurate illustration of the agencies, then 
personal loyalty to superiors should be considered a non-factor.
From a historical perspective, most of the governmental scandals our nation has endured in 
recent time (e.g., Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, Water Boarding, Enron, Foreclosures) have 
essentially been products of personal loyalty to superiors. The subordinates indicted in these 
scandals chose the lure of personal loyalty to superiors over the maxims of constitutional 
principles, public duty, and institutional integrity. Although critics may blame this on outside 
political pressure, the fact remains that most such pressures could have been expediently 
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ameliorated if the subordinates themselves were better educated in the logics of institutional and 
integrated loyalties. The case of President Nixon is a cause celebre. In 1972 Richard Nixon 
demanded the dismissal of Archibald Cox, the special Prosecutor in the Watergate Affair. His 
demand was rejected by both Attorney Generals Elliot Richardson and Assistant Attorney 
General William Ruckelshaus. These two officials chose to resign in protest alerting the 
Congress and the nation to the dangerous constitutional standoff. Like many others, perhaps, 
they could have granted the President his wish without any risk to their careers. Indeed, they 
might have been rewarded handsomely for doing so. Nevertheless, they chose to exercise 
integrated loyalty. As a result, what was politically labeled America's Saturday Night Massacre 
turned out to be its defining moment.
The Physiology of Personal Loyalty to Superiors
Criminal justice subordinates are the most powerful (and at times, the most lethal) public 
servants in the United States. As such, they should be more aware of issues of loyalty and 
loyalties within their agencies than their counterparts in other public agencies. When they make 
an arrest, lock up an inmate, or revoke a probation, they are inevitably reminded of where their 
primary loyalty lies: to the Constitution, the community, the public good, agency rules, their 
bosses, their partners, or to themselves. While several of these loyalties may compete with each 
other, subordinates must be able to “verstehen" [Weber’s postulate for understanding with a 
commitment to assist in a sympathetic and noble manner] (Wrong, 1970,19). Also, while 
politics at the workplace can admittedly blur the subordinates' ability to navigate where their 
loyalties lie, agency leaders should take the time and energy to educate their subordinates on the 
role of loyalty in the organizational culture, the dangers of personal loyalty to superiors, and the 
moral courage associated with institutional and integrated loyalties. Through real or fictitious 
experiences, the subordinates should be made aware that personal loyalty to superiors can be 
antithetical to the agency’s mission, while institutional and integrated loyalties epitomize the 
values of enlightenment, professionalism, moral courage, and progressiveness.
On the practical side, it is not hard to realize that concern for personal loyalty to superiors 
does enter into the vast majority of decisions the subordinates make. Almost subconsciously, the 
subordinates ask themselves if they did this or that, whom will they please, and whom will they 
offend; who will support them and who will denounce them; and, inescapably, whether their 
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careers will prosper or suffer as a result. To articulate this point, consider, for example, the 
symbolic, yet not uncommon, case of a police officer who pulls over a female driver for speeding 
and who, upon questioning her, recognizes here as the police chief's daughter. The officer will 
typically agonize over the high probability that the chief will have a negative reaction, whereas if 
the driver was another person, he would not.
From an ethical perspective, the police officers' decision to investigate a crime scene 
naturally depends on the gravity of the offense, departmental rules and regulations, the officers’ 
sense of experience, and their trust in their department's sense of fairness. The issue of personal 
loyalty to superiors is never mentioned in this configuration. Ethical police officers are content 
with this argument because it represents their devotion to professionalism, to their character, and 
to the truth.
The Goliath of Disloyalty
Issues of personal loyalty to superiors create a clash between two moral senses: 
commitment to the sanctity of public service and loyalty to ones superiors, those who control the 
worker's destiny. Resolving this clash is critical to the construction of the social reality at the 
workplace. Kleinig describes this clash as a form of psychological dismemberment; one that can 
cause delusions and undermine the workers' self-esteem). If such a conflict is not resolved, 
“moral schizophrenia” may set in turning hard-working subordinates into confused and 
disoriented mercenaries (Souryal, 1999).
The strain of this moral schizophrenia can be enormous and, if untreated, can diminish 
productivity, increase cynicism, encourage corruption, and cause psychological depression. 
Because of its slow radiation nature, few subordinates may realize its debilitating effect. It is not 
atypical that after a scandal erupts at work, the subordinates find it necessary to communicate 
their fears surreptitiously during lunch or coffee breaks or hide themselves behind their locked 
office doors. The resulting condition is a lingering "internal bleeding" that saps institutional 
integrity and diminishes the moral stamina of the workers. One of the more stressful slow- 
radiation conditions at the workplace, perhaps, is the subordinates’ fear of losing their jobs under 
the threat of being accused of disloyalty. Under such circumstances, it would be almost 
impossible for the subordinates to defend themselves by administrative means or to restore their 
reputation through judicial recourse.
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Historically, disloyalty has been recorded as the most shameful of defections. Kleinig 
(1995, 122) describes disloyalty as "the forsaking of an object of loyalty for self-serving and 
individualistic or self-assertive reasons." In this context, it seems clear that disloyalty is an 
ethical rather than a legal concept—one that is seen as an act of social or occupational betrayal. 
Subsequently, disloyal subordinates are normally considered pariahs, and their chances for 
survival on the job are demonstratively low.
In management literature, being accused of disloyalty is one of the most serious and 
frightening events, if for no other reason than the nebulousness of the accusation. This is due, in 
part, to the previously stated misuse of the dichotomous rule: the opposite of loyalty is not 
disloyalty, thus disloyalty to a superior may have little or no effect on one’s loyalty to the 
organization. Indeed, as Thomas Jefferson once suggested, an act of a-loyalty every now and 
then may have a healthy effect on the organization. It reminds the subordinates of the value of 
integrated loyalty; one that signifies "safeguarding lives and property, protecting the innocent 
against deception, and the weak against oppression or intimidation" (Law Enforcement Code of 
Ethics, 2000).
To avoid the accusation of disloyalty to superiors, many criminal justice subordinates play 
the “personal-loyalty card” to protect themselves. Some find it safer to adopt a self-protective 
mode simply by acting more like orderlies to powerful superiors. Morris (1997, 123) described 
that mode profoundly when he stated “like turtles, they crawl into their shells and hide." On the 
other hand, adopting such a mode can bring shame on the practitioner and devolve into acts of 
self-humiliation and embarrassment (Denhardt, 1987).
To better understand issues of loyalty and disloyalty at the workplace, it might be fair to 
suggest that the dichotomous rule of loyal-disloyal be replaced by a modified version of 
Drucker’s dictum [the modification is mine]: Subordinates can neither be considered loyal or 
disloyal to their agencies as long as they fully accomplish their legal and moral obligations, nor 
should they be blamed for respectfully detaching themselves from superiors who may be 
unprofessional, unenlightened, or seek to serve their own interests. Unless the previously 
modified Drucker’s dictum is seriously considered, it should be safe to believe that a-loyal 
criminal justice subordinates are not careless individuals but may well be far more professional 
because they are motivated by a higher set of loyalties.
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Recommendations and Conclusions
To discourage the practice of personal loyalty along with the discussed problems 
associated with it, it seems logical to invoke the ideals of duty and public service, respectively. 
Dutifulness is the workers' obligation to do the best they possibly can do in the service of their 
publics rather than themselves or each other (Souryal, 1999). In Kantian terms, dutifulness is 
then a “categorical imperative, ” since it consists of ethical ideals that are abstract, objective, and 
universally recognized. Furthermore, since dutifulness commits subordinates to carrying out their 
assignments as binding legal and moral contracts, by virtue of these contracts, they would have 
little or no incentive to compromise themselves by seeking personal loyalty to superiors rather 
than devoting themselves to institutional and integrated loyalties.
The duty-based proposition consists of two metaphorical "lungs." The choice of the word 
lungs is here necessary since it is associated with the idea of systematically working in unison, 
one cannot work against the other. These lungs are professional accountability, and 
organizational identification. The former reinforces compliance with agency rules and 
regulations, the latter preservsing individual responsibility. The former focuses on procedural 
matters, the latter on substantive matters. The former signifies policy decisions, the latter 
discretionary decisions. Working in unison, the “lungs” can maximize productivity without 
requiring the subordinates to engage in any unnecessary pacts with superiors. To incorporate this 
duty-based thesis, four managerial changes should be considered:
First, the use of the term “loyalty-disloyalty” should be as much as possible replaced by a less 
confrontational term, one conducive to a smoother association between superiors and 
subordinates.
Loyalty, especially at the workplace, is an emotionally charged word. It implies "taking 
sides," "offering one's all," "supporting one's camp at any price," and, in extreme cases, engaging 
in a “jihad". Although the perceptions associated with these terms can enable the subordinates 
to separate acceptable behaviors from unacceptable behaviors, they also lead to irrational and 
dangerous conclusions (Zerubavel, 1991). The workers may be persuaded to see the workplace 
as consisting of opposing camps: those who are "in the social cluster" and those "outside the 
social cluster"; those favored "regardless of what they do" and those disfavored "despite what 
they do"; and possibly between those who "deserve justice" and those "who deserve it not." And 
since the essence of public administration (let alone criminal justice) is optimal functionality, 
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then all such perceptions, even if accurate, can cause unnecessary occupational friction and 
hostility that, in turn, can diminish work productivity, regardless of who wins and who loses. 
Second, the culture of criminal justice agencies should be open, vibrant, and sensible.
Although stressful at times, the culture of criminal justice, by virtue of its nature, should be 
the most likely field of liberal arts to embrace the principles of veracity, impartiality, tolerance, 
and good faith. Subsequently, in lieu of the personal loyalty paradigm, criminal justice agencies 
should use concepts such as collaboration, cooperation, and mutual support. Such concepts have 
a favorable sociological effect that can unite workers and superiors in a social entity that 
transcends obsession with ranks, cliques, antipathies, salutations, and loyalties and betrayals. 
Third, dutiful supervision should be strengthened.
The ideal of duty suggests that when criminal justice subordinates make procedural 
decisions, they should act consistent with agency rules and regulation. Yet, for this to occur, a 
thorough system of "dutiful supervision" should be in place. Supervisors should devise 
reasonable standards, apply fair sanctions, exercise appropriate discretion, and, when necessary, 
get rid of "uncooperative" workers. Dutiful supervision also cannot be performed in a Kantian 
context; it requires human concern, one that can stimulate the sentiments of self-control, 
responsibility, accountability, and good faith (Wilson, 1993). Furthermore, for such a 
recommendation to succeed, an assumption of fairness must first pervade the workplace culture. 
The absence of such an assumption can be calamitous to any criminal justice agency regardless 
of which loyalty level it embraces.
Fourth, professional accountability should be maximized.
When criminal justice subordinates make discretionary decisions, they should—above 
anything else—be motivated by professional accountability. Their determination of what is legal, 
reasonable, justifiable, or moral must reflect both institution and integrated loyalties. Although 
the subordinates can, and should, always seek guidance from their superiors, their acquiescence 
should be based on reasoning and logical justification. This requires that the relationship between 
the subordinates and the superiors be enlightened and civil—one that is characterized by 
maturity not subservience, respect not fear, strength not feebleness, and optimism not dejection. 
If these characteristics are patiently cultivated within the agency’s culture, both the subordinates 
and superiors will begin to appreciate the benefits of organizational identification, the 
institutional imperative of serving the public interest, before any other.
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When professional accountability and organizational identification are nourished in any 
agency it would be only natural that criminal justice subordinates develop a philosophical 
conviction of justice and a dignified understanding of themselves as professionals. The more 
they learn, the more they will wish to better serve the public. As a result, the subordinates will 
develop the knowledge and the moral courage that enables them to support their superiors when 
they are right and to correct them when they are wrong. The superiors, in turn, should be able to 
see the institutional danger of personal loyalty to superiors and the wisdom to respond to their 
subordinates with noblesse oblige, a fundamental sentiment that emphasizes understanding, 
appreciation, and, above all, patience. Finally, with the growth of mutual trust between 
subordinates and superiors, subordinates may finally be able to see their superiors as role models, 
dedicated mentors, philosopher kings, and (when mutually agreeable) friends.
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